

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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| DATE : 24 FEB 62 | 051 | WGS | SECRET |
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TO : [REDACTED] *21*

FROM : [REDACTED]

ACTION : APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN-2001

INFO :

FILE

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EXEMPT
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PRIORITY

IN 32813

PRIORITY

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
[C]

DELIVER FOLLOWING FROM WILLIAM BUNDY DEFENSE EYES ONLY NITZE FOR

MCNAMARA PASS STATE ALSO WHITE HOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY.

AT GENERALISSIMOS REQUEST HAD LONG APPOINTMENT WITH HIM EVENING

23RD. PRESENT WERE / RAY CLINE AND GENERAL CHIANG CHING KUO AND INTERPRETER
GENERAL I FUEN.

GIMO BEGAN BY ASKING BUNDY REACTION TO SO-CALLED GRC COUNTERATTACK
PROJECT. BUNDY REPLIED THAT HE NOT DIRECTLY CONCERNED THIS MATTER
AND HAD NO AUTHORITY EXPRESS USG VIEWS BUT HAD TALKED THAT AFTERNOON
TO CHING KUO AND HAD READ TRANSLATED MEMORANDUM OF PROJECT. (THIS
TEXT TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY.) HIS INITIAL OBSERVATION COULD ONLY BE THAT
PROPOSAL CLEARLY INTERESTING AND IMPORTANT. GIMO THEN STATED US
NATURALLY VITALLY CONCERNED GRC COUNTERATTACK PLANNING AND LAUNCHED INTO

~~SECRET~~
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Open No. 1

LONG STATEMENT OF BASIC PRINCIPLES AS FOLLOWS:

A. GRC WOULD NEVER EMBARRASS US BY ITS ACTION.

B. GRC WOULD NOT ACT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AFFECT SECURITY OF
TAIWAN AND PENGHU.

C. GRC WOULD NOT GIVE USSR PRETEXT TO EXPAND HOSTILITIES.

D. US WOULD BEAR NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR GRC ACTION ON MAINLAND
AND ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN IN SUCH A WAY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO
EVIDENCE OF US SUPPORT. GRC INTENDED TO AVOID DRAGGING US INTO
LOCAL WAR OVER MAINLAND LET ALONE INTO GENERAL WAR.

E. GRC WOULD ALWAYS CONSIDER US INTERESTS IN ITS PLANS AND IN
PARTICULAR HAD A MORAL RESPONSIBILITY TO USE US-PROVIDED MILITARY
EQUIPMENT ONLY IN A WAY SERVING US INTERESTS. (COMMENT: THIS
REMARK COULD BE CONSTRUED AS INDICATING GRC CONSIDERED IT HAD
GREATER LATITUDE IN ACTIONS NOT USING SUCH EQUIPMENT.)

BUNDY INTERJECTED THAT IT WAS MOST DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO BE
DISSOCIATED AND NOT BLAMED FOR ANY ACTION TAKEN BY THE GRC. FOR THIS
REASON AS WELL AS FOR THE WIDER GRC-US RELATIONSHIP IT WAS VITAL THAT
THERE BE THE CLOSEST JOINT CONSULTATION ON ANY ACTION TAKEN.

GIMO THEN WENT ON THAT SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF ACTION WOULD HAVE GREAT EFFECT ON WHOLE FREE WORLD. NOT ONLY SURVIVAL OF GRC BUT WHOLE COMMUNIST STRATEGIC THREAT WAS AT STAKE. SUCCESS MUST BE ASSURED SINCE FAILURE WOULD BE AS DAMAGING AS SUCCESS WOULD BE HELPFUL.

GIMO CONTINUED ON THEME OF US RESPONSIBILITY AS LEADER OF FREE WORLD. LOSS OF CHINA MAINLAND HAD BEEN KEY SHIFT IN BALANCE OF POWER AND TRENDS SINCE HAD CONTINUED ADVERSE. US SHOULD TRY TO REGAIN BALANCE OF POWER AND TO SAVE PEOPLE NOW IN COMMIE SLAVERY. GRC COUNTERATTACK PROJECT KEY PART OF THIS SITUATION. US ANNOUNCED POLICY WAS FOR LIBERATION OF CAPTIVE PEOPLES BUT IN EIGHT YEARS EISENHOWER HAD ACHIEVED LITTLE TOWARD THIS. NOW KENNEDY MUST TAKE ACTION AND NOT MERELY STATE AIM. GRC CONSIDERED OPPORTUNITY SUCH ACTION NOW EXISTED BECAUSE OF:

- A. SINO-SOVIET RIFT.
- B. CHICOM ECONOMIC FAILURE ON MAINLAND
- C. LOSS OF CONTROL OF PEOPLE ON MAINLAND. (NO SPECIFIC EVIDENCE

GIVEN.)

ENORMOUS STRENGTH WAS NEEDED TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY. GRC FORCES WERE WELL-TRAINED AND READY AND BEST STRENGTH AVAILABLE. COMMUNISM

MUST BE ATTACKED AT ITS MOST VULNERABLE AREA EVEN AT COMMUNIST STRATEGY WAS TO STRIKE FREE WORLD WHERE WEAKEST. MAINLAND CHINA WAS COMMIE WEAKEST POINT AND ALSO BIGGEST POTENTIAL THREAT DUE TO POPULATION SIZE. US DID NOT HAVE CORRECT TOOL IN FORM OF FORCES TO USE BEHIND COMMIE LINES. GRC HAD PREPARED THIRTEEN YEARS AND NOW HAD FORCES EQUAL TO THE TASK IN VIEW OF CRITICAL MAINLAND SITUATION. GIMO WISHED USG TO KNOW THIS AND TO BE AWARE HIS VIEW THAT NOW WAS TIME TO TAKE ACTION AND NOT LET OPPORTUNITY SLIP.

BUNDY REPLIED USG AND PRESIDENT IN PARTICULAR FIRMLY HELD
ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF LIBERATING CAPTIVE PEOPLES INCLUDING
PARTICULARLY CHINA MAINLAND. TIMING AND CAPABILITY HAD ALWAYS
BEEN THE ISSUES. USG MUST BE SURE ANY EFFORT WOULD NOT FAIL.
THIS AND IMPORTANCE OF STAKES AS STATED BY GIMO UNDERLINED THAT
JOINT CONSULTATION AND APPRECIATION OF SITUATION VITAL. MOREOVER
THIS PROJECT CONSIDERABLY EXPANDED SCALE OF WILD DRAGON PLAN AGREED
IN 1956 (FOR CREATION 20-MAN TEAMS) AND THUS SPECIFICALLY REQUIRED
JOINT STUDY.

GIMO BRIEFLY RESPONDED THAT PROJECT SHOULD BE STUDIED
JOINTLY. THEN EXPANDED SOMEWHAT ON SPECIFICS STATING THAT GRC

CHARTS

PREFACE

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HAD CONCLUDED DROPPING LESS THAN 200-300 MAN INITIAL FORCE WOULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE. CONCLUSION FROM EXPERIENCE AND STUDY WAS THAT SMALLER TEAMS WOULD FAIL AND GIMO WOULD NOT TAKE RESPONSIBILITY EXPOSING MEN TO SUCH FAILURE. APPROACH OF NEW PROJECT WAS SAME. BUT MANPOWER GREATER.

BUNDY SAID HE WOULD REPORT VIEWS CAREFULLY VIA [REDACTED] EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs (C) CHANNEL. GIMO WELCOMED THIS. (BUNDY DID NOT SPECIFY TO WHOM HE WOULD REPORT.)

NEXT PART OF GIMO STATEMENTS SOMEWHAT RAMBLING AND COVERED ARGUMENTS THAT US COULD USE TO MEET PROPAGANDA ATTACKS AND AVOID DIFFICULTIES WITH OTHER FREE WORLD NATIONS. FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS THAT CHINESE CIVIL WAR HAD NEVER STOPPED AS SHOWN BY OSI SHELLING.

THEREFORE USG COULD ASSERT IT NATURAL THAT GRC FIGHT BACK. WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY SO STATING GIMO THEN MOVED TO SITUATION AFTER INITIAL PHASE AND ASSUMED GRC FORCES FULLY ENGAGED. ALL THAT GRC WANTED OF US AT THIS POINT WAS CONTINUED DEFENCE TAIWAN AND PENGHUS (NEVER REFERRED TO OSI). US SHOULD NOT DIRECTLY ENTER WAR ON MAINLAND. AT ONE POINT GIMO SAID US SHOULD ONLY EXPRESS SYMPATHY

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FOR STARVING PEOPLE ON MAINLAND AND GOAL OF LIBERATION BUT THEN
LATER SAID US MIGHT ALSO QUOTE SECRETLY OR INDIRECTLY UNQUOTE GIVE
LOGISTIC SUPPORT AS WELL AS MORAL SUPPORT. WHAT GRC MAINLY WANTED WAS
US QUOTE TACIT AGREEMENT UNQUOTE THAT COUNTERATTACK PROJECT WAS
WORTHWHILE EFFORT ON BEHALF FREE WORLD TO LIBERATE MAINLAND.

GRC GRATEFUL FOR PAST US MILITARY AID AND NOW CONSIDERED FORCES
ADEQUATE FOR TASK WITHOUT MORE DIRECT US MILITARY SUPPORT.

BUNDY AGAIN REITERATED NEED FOR JOINT CONSULTATION SINCE SUCCESS
OR FAILURE VITAL TO US AS WELL AS GRC AND INDEED TO WHOLE FREE WORLD
POSITION. SAID USG COULD SURELY NOT EXTEND TACIT AGREEMENT TO
SOMETHING ON WHICH IT HAD NOT BEEN FULLY CONSULTED. GIMO AGREED.

CONVERSATION CONCLUDED AFTER HOUR AND HALF WITH GIMO SENDING
FEST WISHES MCGEORGE BUNDY. BUNDY REMARKED HE CONTINUING ON TO
SAIGON AND PARTICULARLY CONCERNED VIETNAM SITUATION BUT GIMO DID NOT
FOLLOW THIS UP.

COMMENT. CONVERSATION FRIENDLY THROUGHKOUT AND AS ABOVE INDICATES
ALMOST WHOLLY ONE-SIDED. OPENING PHASE CARRIED CONSIDERABLE OVERTONE
POSSIBLE UNILATERAL ACTION BUT TENOR SHIFTED THEREAFTER TO APPARENT

ACCEPTANCE THEME OF JOINT STUDY INCLUDING CONTINUED USE OF

CHANNEL FOR DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT. CLOSING GREETING [C]

UNDERSCORED THAT LENGTH AND THRUST OF CONVERSATION RELATED TO BUNDY

FRATERNAL RATHER THAN DOD TIES. GIMO NEVER REFERRED DIRECTLY TO

PRESIDENT OR SUBMITTING PROJECT FORMALLY TO USG SO BELIEVE

CONVERSATION DID NOT CHANGE STATUS DISCUSSIONS CONDUCTED THROUGH

GIMO PRINCIPALLY USING WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS HIGH LEVEL EAR (C)

AND SEEKING TO MEET OBVIOUS PRINCIPAL US OBJECTIONS AND CONCERNS

AND TO STRESS HIS VIEW THAT NOW WAS TIME TO STRIKE. AMB FULLY

INFORMED BY

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

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[C]

END OF MESSAGE

ANSWER: *None of the above*

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